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Abstract. What is the role of the intellectual foundations caused by social crisis in the emergence of contemporary 
Islamic Salafi movements in the Middle East? which thinkers in the history are considered as the founders of new 
Islamic Salafist in the Middle East; moreover the thoughts of these thinkers were born from which crisis and social 
relations? Analysis of this phenomenon based on pure religious teachings is in vain; therefore, our method in this 
article in addition to referring to the most important thinking dimensions of influential thinkers in the emergence of 
contemporary Islamic Salafi in the Middle East, was to analyze and explain the effective social crisis in the above 
phenomenon. in this article, the role of crises such as the succession crisis of the Prophet Muhammad, the collapse of 
the Abbasid caliphate, the Mongol invasion, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the First World War, the colonial 
constitution, the relations of the colonial states and ... had been shown in the creation of this movements, and finally, it 
had been concluded that the radical and controversial thoughts of contemporary Islamic Salafi and Takfiri movements 
have been caused by radical and controversial social conditions and crises. 
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Introduction and Problem Statement. The extraordinary expansion of Salafist Islamic social currents and 
movements since the late 1970s onwards in Middle East and across the world is indeed the objective outcome of the 
vicissitudinous history of intellectual and social developments in Islamic world from its dawn. History of Islam has 
been witness to movements that have emerged from the heart of sociological crises some of which have been born 
dead while others continued their lives throughout the history after laying down the groundwork of their intellectual 
and social lineage. One of the striking features of most Islamic movements is their circularity. To put it otherwise, 
these movements undergo through consecutive periods of stagnation and resurrection. In fact, one can argue that in  
the course of Islamic history the occurrence of Islamic uprisings and movements has been restricted to great chaos and 
diversity eras, i.e. those eras in which the existence, spiritual and identity consistency of Islamic world were exposed 
to tension and threat. If we want to provide a chronological periodization of the history of Islamic social movements 
since the dawn of Islam until now we can do it as follows: 
Islam Prophet’s Ummah: the movement and society, the structures of which were founded by the Prophet 
based on divine revelation and in the form of Islamic Sharia can be declared as the first and purest Islamic movement. 
This movement emerged in response to the crisis of Bedouin Arab ignorance in Arabian Peninsula rather in the whole 
world. The measure and scale of purity of this movement were clearly based on revealed teachings and Prophet’s 
words and deeds. These teachings came to be known after Prophet’s as “Quran” or “Mus'haf” while prophetic deeds 
and words were categorized as “Sunnah” and “Al-sīra” )tradition and way of life(. 
Succession Crisis (632-661 AD.): After the decease of the Islam Prophet, the social crisis that immediately 
engulfed Islamic society was the succession crisis. This crisis set the scene for the emergence of discord and disunion 
in the body of united Islamic nation. The caliphate of Abu Bakr and Omar relatively controlled and managed the 
crisis; but after the beginning of the caliphate of the Third Caliph, the ground was paved for the foundation of first 
period of theclannish caliphate of Umayyad. 
Rise and Fall of Umayyad Caliphate (661-750 AD.): The majority of Muslims, particularly Shia Muslims, 
never tolerated the legitimacy of Umayyad caliphate and considered it a huge deviance from the movement of Prophet 
Muhammad. The first reaction to the political, social and ethical decadence of Umayyad caliphate after Husayn ibn  
Ali Movement can be seen in the approach adopted by Omar Ibn Abdu al-Aziz. When he undertook the leadership of 
Islamic society he decided to act as a reformist and ground the bases of a reformist movement that aims at clearing the 
dust of the utter intellectual and social deviance and eradicating the dominant spirit of bigotry, haughtiness and 
Ashaarism of Umayyad generation. His intellectual heritage continued its life in the form of social movements led by 
Abu Hanifah (founder of Hanafi School), and MalekIbnAnas both of whom played the role of a “reformer”. 
Rise and Fall of Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258 AD.): In 750 AD. another social crisis engulfed Islamic world 
from which a social revolutionary movement emerged under the leadership of Abu al-Abbas that finally led to the 
formation of Abbasid Caliphate.IbnHanbal is declared the first Imam and supporter of Sunni fundamentalism. Hanbali 
jurisprudential school that was a type of resistance/reaction to the Inquisition Tribunal of Muʿtazila in Abbasid era is 
considered to be the basis of Wahhabi fundamentalism in contemporary era (official ideology of the Kings of Saudi 
Arabia) (Dekmejian, 2011: 43-44). This is the same ideology and thought that was revived later in Islamic world by 
IbnTaymiyyah, Muhammad Ibn Abdu al-Wahhab, and Rashid Reza as a response to the dominant social crises. The 
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fall of Abbasid Caliphate following the Mongol invasion brought about a huge crisis in Islamic world; this was the 
crisis from the heart of which a radical aggressive social movement emerged, which was led by IbnTaymiyyah. 
Ottoman Caliphate (1299-1922 AD.): After the fall of Abbasid caliphate a kind of power transition from 
Arabs to Turks occurred in the form of Ottoman Empire. However, even this caliphate faced a challenge in the late 
19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries that Bernard Lewis calls “challenge of modernity”. It was indeed this challenge that  
finally eliminated Ottoman Empire from international scene in 1922 and caused the affairs of Middle East to be 
undertaken by western states that turned the region into a ground for imperialistic competitions (Lewis, 2014: 355). 
Three revivalist social movements of Wahhabism, Mahdism and Senussi emerged in later Ottoman era, the most 
expansive and influential one of which was the Wahhabi Monotheists Movement led by Muhammad Ibn Abdu al- 
Wahhab. 
Fall of Ottoman Empire: WWI, Sykes–Picot Agreement and Belfour Declaration, and finally the fall of 
Ottoman Empire caused serious damages to the pride, identity and collective conscience of the majority of Muslim 
societies in the Middle East.The fall of Ottoman Empire in its confrontation with European Imperialism triggered a set 
of reformist reactions/movements in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The chief motivation behind these reformist 
and moderate intellectual movements can be sought for in the ideas of Seyyed Jamal al-Din Asadabadi and 
Muhammad Abduhwho were the pioneers of universal Islamic union and resistance before European imperialism 
through a kind of returning to an Islam that is more coherent with the features of modern world (Hatami and Bahrani, 
2013: 100-101). But after them, Rashid Reza who was after the revival of caliphate system revised the whole ideas in 
this regard and supported the revivalist social movement of Wahhabism. 
Muslim Brotherhood and Neo-Salafism (contemporary era, since 1928 until now): During mid-1930s Rashid 
Reza’s moderate activism was replaced with radical social movement of “Muslim Brotherhood” led by Hassan al- 
Banna(the pupil of Rashid Reza). In this era when social crises, resulting from political turmoil, improper leadership, 
social and economic conflict, European imperialism and the clash between Islam and the newly emerged western 
conceptshad overshadowed the whole Islamic world, the emergence of an alternative radical Islamism that was based 
on the inherited ideas of previous reformists seemed unavoidable (Dekmejian, 2011: 49). In its beginning,this 
movement appeared relatively intelligible and logical but following the developments of 1970s and after the death of 
Jamal Abdu al-Nasir and also due to the exclusivist and authoritarian policies of nationalist, socialist and secular states 
in Middle East before the Salafist social movements that sought to take part in political affairs, the movements 
motivated by Muslim Brotherhood turned radical. The new Salafist social movements (that through a huge 
epistemological interruption have undergone a significant intellectual turn to the ideas of IbnTaymmiyyah, 
Muhammad Ibn Abdu al-Wahhab, and in contemporary era and based on the thoughts of these two thinkers, to such 
figures as Abdullah ‘Ezam, Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, Abu Muhammad al-Muqadasi, 
Abu BakrNaji, Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir al-Misri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and so on and so forth) are the outcomes of 
the conflicts and various interpretations of the ideas of the forefathers of Salafism that have created different  
structures within miscellaneous social crises. 
The main problem of this research (that represents its necessity and importance) is synthetic and dialectical 
description and analysis of the most significant intellectual and social factors of the emergence and rise of Salafist 
social movements in Middle East in an intellectual and sociological context. In other words, the current study seeks to 
explain the intellectual and social bases of contemporary Salafism and consequently its impact on the emergence of 
Salafi fundamental and terrorist social movements (like Al-Qaeda and ISIS) that spread terror under the banner of 
Islam. 
Research Objectives and Questions. Every scientific research contains certain objectives and primary and 
secondary questions that have to be answered. The questions of this research are also of two,primary and secondary 
types. The primary question of this research is: Which social and intellectual crises in the past and present times have 
led to the emergence of contemporary Salafist social movements? The secondary questions of this paper are as 
follows: 1- What are the intellectual principles of Salafism? Who are the forefathers of contemporary Salafism? 2- 
What is the role of social crises and the relations of Western world with Islamic world in the rise of contemporary 
Takfirist and Salafist social movements as well as in the promotion of aggression and terror? 
Research Background. Numerous works, theses and papers have been authored independently regarding 
intellectual and social principles of Salafism, some of which can be reviewed here by the authors as follows: 
1- Political Sociology of Social Movements (2011), Hamid Ahmadi, Imam Sadeq University Press, 
particularly the discussion on Islamism and the issue of violence. 2- Religious Violence under the Banner of 
Textualism (Puritanism) in Islam and Christianity; focusing on Islamic Salafism and Christian Fundamentalism 
(2015), RuhullahShahamatDehsorkhi and Seyed Ali Hassani, Journal of Knowledge of Religions. 3- Political 
Movements of Middle East: From Salafism to Neo-Salafism (2013), HojatollahJudaki et al., Month Book of History 
and Geography. 4- Outcome of Al-Qaeda’s Salafism in Islamic World (2006), Hamid Reza Esmaeili, Strategic Studies 
of Islamic World. 5- Power and Violence in Political Islam (2010), ArashRaeisinezhad, MA Thesis, Faculty of Law 
and Political Sciences, Tehran University. 6- Ideological Roots of Terrorism: Focusing on the Ideology of Al-Qaeda  
as a Case Study (2009), AzarAlinezhad, MA Thesis, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Tehran University. 7- US 
Foreign Policy and Expansion of Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism after 1990s (2007), Muhammad SadeqJokar, MA 
Thesis, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Tehran University. 8- Critical Study of Salafist Ideas of Monotheism 
and Prophecy (2003), Ali Allah Behashti, Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Theology, Tehran University. The general 
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approach of the aforementioned books, theses and papers can be divided into three classes: 1- Some of them have  
dealt merely with intellectual principles of Islamic fundamentalism and Salafism. 2- Some have only assayed this  
issue from a political point of view. 3- Some have comparatively studied the relationship between Islam, Islamic 
fundamentalism and the notion of “violence” as a whole.Moreover, the cited works are restricted to jurisprudence, 
theology, scholastic discourse and political sciences and have not entered the domain of sociology and social sciences. 
What distinguishes this paper from other books, theses and papers and adds to its significance is the reduction, 
definition and appropriation of the subject and the excavation of intellectual and social foundations of the emergence 
of Salafist social movements in an eclectic and synthetic manner. Of course, it is far too clear that the content of the 
current paper may have certain overlaps with other important studies in some details though the total essence of the 
article with respect to its subject-matter and method is distinguished. 
Theoretical Considerations. If social movements can be considered organizations that have been constituted 
to defend, expand and achieve particular goals that are essentially actionalistic; (Rocher, 2008: 129-132) no doubt, 
contemporary Salafist movements can be included among them. Social movements that are one of the most powerful 
and influential forms of collective action in social dimensions (Giddens and Birdsall, 2011: 635) not only play a vital 
role in political sociology but are also heavily engaged in definition of notions and concepts, evolution of identities 
and individual life style and are analyzed in political sociology in this way. Moreover, they make cultural politics 
focused on “social change” as the core of social interests. (Nash, 2015: 129-130) This is why the significance of 
sociological analysis of their emergence in the context of society and social crises doubles. Social crises, according to 
the suggested definition, are particular social and psychological pressures that lead to the collapse of the common 
systems and notions of life and social reactions. In other words,the emergence of these crises is the result of 
occurrence of lack of unity and consequently inability of political and social system in organizing social order and 
tackling disorders that poses threats to general balance and normal function of social, political and cultural life  
(Waezi, 2011: 30-33). The rise of contemporary Takfirist and Salafistsocial movements under the banner of the 
concept of political Islam is also the legitimate son of crises, i.e. social, political, military, and cultural crises that have 
continuously led to the continuous emergence of revolutionary uprisings in consecutive Muslim generations and have 
made them to reclaim their identity through revolutionary actions. HrairDekmejian believes in “circular or epochal 
model” in this regard, according to which radical movements emerge and fall in social and political contexts: “in fact, 
there is a causal relationship between spiritual, social and political chaos and the rise of fundamentalist movements” 
(Dekmejian, 2011: 36). Indeed, in his circular and dialectical model, crises play a significant role in the emergence of 
ideas and movements. According to Dekmejian, Islamic social movements are not new phenomena, rather they are 
merely contemporary manifestations of historical streams that have emerged during the post-Islamic era in various 
parts of Islamic world (Hatami and Bahrani, 2013: 1/28). New Takfirist and Salafist social movements are not 
exceptions in this regard and in the words of Giddens, their analysis based on mere intellectual and religious teachings 
will be defected (Giddens and Birdsall, 2011: 815). In the present research, we have sought to analyze contemporary 
Salafist movements in Middle East that have taken form at the heart of social crises relying on the epochal theory 
presented by Dekmejianafter providing an account of the most significant intellectual principles of Salafist 
theoreticians and thinkers (who were themselves the products of social crises). In other words, in this research the 
intellectual contexts and social crises (particularly in modern times) and the quality of their impact on the emergence 
of contemporary Takfirist and Salafist social movements in Middle East are excavated. 
Methodology and Research Technique. The methodology and research technique that we have chosen in 
this study based on its conceptual framework for data collection is the library based and  documentarymethod,and 
since in this research method, depiction of goals, nature and research problem is the light that guides us towards the 
purposeful, concentrated and condensed study,we have tried to first discuss the key terms used in the research through 
a comprehensive survey of the existing literature in all available formats including intellectual and sociological works 
that are directly or indirectly related with the final goals of the research in the form of note taking, translation, 
summary, articulation and sociological analysis. It is needless to say that first hand references (including Persian, 
Arabic and English works) were of priority as compared to secondary written or unwritten documents due to their 
authority, validity, clarity and meaning. It is noteworthy that in the course of research we shall first turn to intellectual 
genealogy of Salafist movements and explain their intellectual principles and foundations based on the effective ideas 
of individuals who have played an indispensable role in their evolution and then at the final stage we shall provide an 
analysis of the role of social crises in the emergence of contemporary Takfirist and Salafist movements in Middle East 
through a sociological perspective concomitant with theoretical considerations of the research. 
Research Findings. In this research the intellectual principles of forefathers of Salafist movements (despite 
their deep differences in some cases), their influence on next generations, and the role of social crises and contexts in 
the emergence of contemporary Takfirist and Salafistmovements are consecutively assayed and the findings are 
presented. 
Intellectual Genealogy of Salafist Movements. Contemporary Salafism or Neo-Salafism is the product of 
the vicissitudinous history of intellectual disputes of scholars, jurists and thinkers who have emerged in the form of 
various sects and schools in the context of particular social conditions in every era and exist in the current status. 
Reducing all existing attitudes in the Salafism to one unique attitude and restricting it to a specified era is resulted 
from a type of essentialistic shallow-mindedness that the hidden dogmatism embedded in it closes the path to every 
deep excavation; in other words, Salafism is not a unique phenomenon rather it has been understood in different terms 
648 
 
and this is why we have used the word “movements” instead of “movement. Our discussion of Salafism in this paper  
is not theological nor jurisprudential or scholastic rather its genealogy is socially grounded and we seek to understand 
it as a dynamic phenomenon in the course of its developments in history; it has its particular context and time and is 
essentially historical and reveals its historicity through its various forms. The term Salaf that first seems to be  
referring to the past, reactionary and old-fashioned mindset is in one sense (lexical sense) the equivalent of present 
time and in one other sense (terminological sense) its opposite. In both cases the modern and future seeking mind 
struggles to know the reason and quality of the return. Why? To what? And how? All three questions have revealed 
right and wrong consequences in the history of this movement that even now continue to emerge. Basically when we 
excavate the implication of Salafism (in its all forms and branches) and consider it, we come across in it/ them a kind 
of old and deep “dissatisfaction” from the status quo and whatever exists in it. Salafism (that not only is not restricted 
to Islam and one can trace its footprints in various branches of Christianity, Judaism and even Buddhism and other 
non-revealed or irreligious schools too) accuses the present time with all its prevailing conditions and relations of 
deviation and considers it to be reproachable accordingly and believes that the path of deliverance lies in returning to 
the golden age of the majesty of Islamic movement. In Islamic Salafism the golden age refers to the era which was 
founded by Prophet Muhammad and completed by his disciples; the era in which there was no sign of Bid‘ah 
(innovation) and Sharia (Islamic law) of Allah was the source of the actions of servants and the rules of social 
relations. This golden age was an era under the shadow of which the Bedouin Arab of Jahiliyyah era (Pre-Islamic 
period) inherited the rule of a large part of the world within less than a century. Finally, one needs to note that the age 
of “al-salaf al-ṣ āliḥ ” (righteous ancestor) refers to the age of Islam Prophet, his Sahabah (disciples), the Tabi‘un 
(disciples’ followers) and the Tabi‘ al-Tabi‘in (followers of the followers). All thinkers, leaders and followers of 
Salafism (even if they refuse to call themselves so) from IbnTaymiyyah to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (regardless of the 
nature of their ideas and actions) at least verbally believe in the necessity of returning to Quran, prophetic tradition  
and to the righteous ancestor. Here we seek to explain the significant intellectual principles of social movements 
related to Salafism that have had a vital role in their objective embodiment: 
Undoubtedly, IbnTaymiyyah is one of the pioneers of Salafist movement and after Ibn Hanbal (the founder  
of school of traditionalism) he is the most outstanding harbinger of neo-Salafism, and his followers called  him 
“Sheikh al-Islam”. He raised the banner of Salafism while Asha’rites and traditionalists were in conflict and allegedly 
struggled to follow “the people of tradition and community” who lived in the first three centuries (11-300 of AH.). He 
dogmatically and exclusively denied other jurisprudential schools except the Hanbali school
4
 and considered every 
juristic judgement a “heresy” and was against Shia rituals of eulogy, resorting and pilgrimage. He issued a decree of 
Jihad against Mongols, Ismailia, Alavis and Druze. He argued that this jihad is more obligatory than prayer and 
fasting. (Dekmejian, 2011: 79-80). He wrote Minhaj al-Sunnah al-Nabawyah fi Naqz al-Kalam al-Shia al- 
Qadariainin response to AllamaHelli’sMinhaj al-Kiramah fi Marifat al-Emamathat contains arguments against 
Shiism. The major themes of this book (that is of a special place even in modern Takfirist and Salafist currents and 
justifies their violence against Shia) can be outlined as follows: 1- Imamah is not one of the articles of faith, 2- denial 
of Mahdism (in Shia belief), 3- denial of divine vicegerency of Imam Ali and enumeration of the wrong consequences 
of this belief in Shiism, 4- denial of perfect knowledge and perfection of Prophet’s Household: he believed that 
Oza’eiShafe’i and IbnHanbal are more knowledgeable than their contemporary Shia Imams, i.e. Musa IbnJafar, Ali 
Ibn Musa and Muhammad Ibn Ali, 5- criticism of the immaculacy of Prophet’s Household: this criticism has been 
voiced in the treatise of Allah Allah fi Ashabi: “people of Sunnah and Muslim community and religious leaders believe 
that no one of the disciples, or relatives of the Prophet, or those who are religiously righteous or the rest of believers 
are immaculate” (IbnTaymiyyah, 2016: 15). 6- Criticism of the ignorance and superstitions of Shia (‘Enayat, 2013: 71-
74). In the introduction of his work MukhtasarMinhaj al-Sunnahhe calls the Shia Muslims liars: 
“Apostates are the biggest liars of the world… there is no doubt that the issues that are raised by such 
ignorant men as Tusi and Mofid as regards visiting tombs are all baseless and a lie. The lies that I have seen 
in Shia works I do not expect to see even in Christian and Jewish books” (IbnTaymiyyah, 2007: 20). 
He continues in the following words: 
“I swear to God that my studies have not shown any man who believes in Shiism and is at the same time a 
good man in public eyes, let alone those who believe Imamism from the bottom of their hearts.” (ibid: 23). 
These stances about Shia Muslims in his works have had destructive effect on Salafist currents in the course of history 
and contemporary era and triggeredhostile conflicts between Shia and Sunni and have been one of the factors involved 
in the promotion of political violence. Moreover, he considers reason, philosophy and Sufism a type of heresy. 
(Ebrahimi, 2015: 184). IbnTamiyyah’s works had a visible and deep influence on the thoughts and works of Rashid 
Reza (to whom we will turn in upcoming discussions) the Syrian pupil of Muhammad Abduh and the founder of Al- 
Minar Journal (which played an indispensable role in the expansion of the ideas of IbnTaymiyyah in North Africa) in 
 
4
Hanbalism is one of the four major denominations of Sunnism the followers of which follow Ahmad IbnHanbal (164 
AH.). Hanbalists are traditionalist and strongly insist on the surface meaning of traditions and verses. They believe 
that nine things result in apostasy: 1- denial of divinity of God, 2- polytheism, 3- denial of one of divine attributes, 4- 
denial of prophecy, 5- insulting God and the Prophet, 6- leaving or denial of one quintuple worships (prayer, fasting, 
Hajj, alms, jihad) based on consciousness or enmity, 7- denial of prohibitions, 8- claim of prophecy, 9- affirmation of 
the claimer of prophecy (Velaei, 2014: 68). 
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1897. Some streaks of his thought can be found in the ideas of Abu al-‘AlaMaududi and Syed Qutb(of course with 
some fundamental differences), Shukri Mustafa, ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj and Jahiman al-‘Atibi. (Dekmejian, 2011: 
82)Among his works Al-Syasah al-Shar’yah fi Eslah al-Ra’eiva al-Ra’yahhas been most influential on contemporary 
Salafist thinkers. After him until the emergence of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, his pupils like Zahabi, 
IbnQayyim, and IbnKathir almost failed to promote his ideas. 
Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhabis the true immediate successor of IbnTaymiyyah who, after four centuries 
rose from Najd of Hijaz and struggled to revive the Hanbali school based on a reading of IbnTaymiyyah. ‘Abd al- 
Wahhab had the social and political support that IbnTaymiyyah couldn’t have due to the domination of Mongols. The 
full support of Muhammad Ibn Saud
5
 of him that led to the establishment of a government in Dar’eyah city at Najd 
tied political power to Salafist Ideology and provided him with a huge power for promotion and expansion  of his 
ideas. He did not avoid using any form of violence and bigotry for eradication of heresy and apostasy from Islamic 
world. He considered the beliefs of other Muslims in his time the clear extensions of heresy and apostasy and was 
against the superficial quotation of Quranic verses and traditions under the name of pure Islamic monotheism like: 
using amulet, frequent visits of tombs, keeping away from material world and resorting to entities apart from Allah 
and so on and so forth (‘Enayat, 1991: 6 cf. Seqaf, 2008: 62-63). In his interpretation of monotheism and the meaning 
of There is no God but Allah he refers to the verse 57 of chapter Asra’, verses 26 and 27 of chapter Zukhruf, verse 31 
of chapter Tubah, verse 165 of chapter Baqara and writes (on loving someone but Allah): 
“Those who love both God and fake beloveds they are not true believers and can never be declared Muslims 
and will end up in the hell” (‘Abd al-Wahhab, 2010: 34). 
‘Abd al-Wahhabrefers to a prophetic tradition quoted from Sahih-eMuslim and argues that mere declaration of divine 
oneness is not enough and true monotheism requires the believers to excommunicate the fake beloveds otherwise he 
will not be a Muslim and his property and life can be taken (ibid: 35). This intellectual movement after many ups and 
downs succeeded to prevail in Najd, Hijaz and other parts of Arabian Peninsula and finally Saudi Arabian government 
was established. One can state that Wahhabis (the title that is given by the opponents of the ideas of Muhammad Ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhab to his followers) started the greatest and most severe superficial and dogmatic conflict with Shiism 
that was unprecedented in Islamic history. Their excessive violence and fundamentalism in excommunication and 
declaring other Islamic denominations (except Hanbalism) apostates and destruction of sacred places of the Shia and 
their humiliation despite their being a minority caused irreparable damages to the body of Islamic nation that still 
stands (‘Enayat, 2013: 80). 
The intellectual principles of Rashid Reza had a significant role in the emergence of Salafist social 
movements. Rashid Reza was a Syrian national and was chosen in 1920 as the chancellor of Syrian national council in 
Damascus. He was one of the outstanding pupils and followers of Muhammad Abduh and the founder of Al-Minar 
Journal in which he published his own particular Islamic teachings for thirty five years.Althoughin many respects he 
continued the modernist and revivalist movement defended by Muhammad Abduh, he still had different ideas in some 
cases (however few in number and deep in content) including: caliphatism, tribalism, enmity with Sufism and Shiism. 
He sought to make more use of Textualism and excessive traditionalism in interpretation of the verses of Quran in 
order to continue and complement Al-Minar. He believed in the revival of caliphate based on the prophetic teachings. 
Rashid Reza considered caliphate the manifestation of continuity and integrity of religion and state and the objective 
realization of Islamic Sharia in modern world and in this path he sought to take the caliphate back from Turks and 
bring it to the representatives of people. Rashid Reza contends that a Caliph should be pious, courageous, healthy, 
rational, and jurisprudentially competent and of course Arab and from Quraysh but if someone usurps the caliphate to 
overcome the chaos in Muslim community his action is legitimate rather it is necessary (‘Enayat, 1991: 156-159). In a 
book entitled Al-Sunnahva al-Shia aw al-Wahhabiyava al-RafizyahRashid Reza claims that he is continuing the path 
of Seyed Jamal in integrating all Islamic denominations and acquiring unity in Islamic world. He openly insults  
Shiism and argues that they are apostates whose beliefs are contaminated with heresies and distort Quran (Rashid 
Reza, 1947: 12-14). It is perhaps for this reason that ShahidMotahariconsiders him to be a partial fanatic who is the 
follower of IbnTaymiyyah and ‘Abd al-Wahhab and has deviated the religious reform movement. In this regard, he 
writes: 
“Some of them [the proponents of reform in Islamic world] due to a number of deviations, instead of making 
reforms, have paved the path for corruption and thus they are corrupts and not reformists.Seyed Muhammad 
Rashid Reza is one of these corrupts. Rashid Reza pretended more and more to be a reformist and presented 
himself as the follower of Seyed Jamal and Abduh but since he was indeed motivated by the ideas of 
IbnTaymiyyah and Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab instead of Seyed Jamal and Abduh, he was more a 
proponent of Wahhabism than a Muslim reformist. His partial comments particularly concerning Shia show 
that he is not competent to be a reformist. First condition of reformism is one’s being delivered from the 




Muhammad Ibn Saud considered Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab an individual who could overcome the rival 
Sheikhs in Arabia under the banner of “Islamic Jihad” and through the slogan of “returning to the righteous ancestor”. 
In other words, ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s invitation to Sword Jihad provided an opportunity for Ibn Saud to guarantee his 
comprehensive domination over the political arena of Arabia (Hause, 2015: 20). 
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I wish Rashid Reza could purify his mind of ignorant bigotries at least as much as his master Muhammad 
Abduh” (Motahari, 1989: 45-46). 
Rashid Reza was adamant in promoting Arabism, caliphate (Islamic State) as well as in opposing Shiism to the extent 
that he appears more as a fanatic Wahhabi thinker. His discourse of caliphatism (features that he enumerates for 
Islamic State) is now the inseparable facet and rather the central core of political thought of contemporary Salafist 
jihadi thinkers and jurists. His influence on the thoughts of Hassan al-Banna (of course with differences) and 
subsequently the evolution of Muslim Brotherhood Organization amid numerous social crises that engulfed  the 
Islamic World are undeniably important and should be taken into account. Following the fall of Ottoman Empire in 
1922 and the annulment of Islamic Caliphate in 1924 based on the decree issued by Turkey’s Great National 
Assembly, Islamic World underwent an intellectual disintegration and metamorphosis. It seemed that upon the 
emergence of a strong wave of “modernity” in the age of modern nation-states which were so eagerly desired by 
Ataturk and endorsed by Iqbal Lahori (‘Enayat, 2013: 114). There is no for what was declared by Rashid Reza as the 
necessity of caliphate exist, thus in his later theoretical model he introduced Islamic State as an alternative for 
caliphate system. The impact of his thought on Hassan al-Banna played an important role in the evolution of Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood. Due to social and political conditions of the chaotic atmosphere after WWI which was 
associated with the instigation of public emotions in Egypt following the 1919 revolution against UK, fall of Ottoman 
caliphate, prevalence of atheism among intellectuals and university graduates, expansion of the political and 
philosophical secularism by Ataturk and so on and so forth, Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan Al-Banna in 
1928. It was, on the one hand, after the jurisdiction of Islamic teachings in social and political life of Egypt, and on the 
other hand, this movement sought to realize the unity of Arab world and purifying Islamic communities from 
colonialism. These efforts led to the export of this movement to Syria and the establishment of the Association of 
Young Parties in 1948 (‘Enayat, 1991: 240-241). Hassan al-Banna (pupil of Rashid Reza) sought to actualize the 
dreams of Seyed Jamal for founding a revolutionary Islamic party. He considered himself a member of Rashid Reza’s 
family and tried to establish a concentrated Islamic state (Ebrahimi, 2015: 180-181). He offered a model  for  
promotion of Muslim Brotherhood's ideology which was based on three basic foundations: Islam is a comprehensive 
and evolving school that has determined the final borders of life in all respects, Islam has been founded on two basic 
pillars of Quran and tradition and Islam is of a function that is valid in all times and places. Hassan al-Banna was a 
professional organizer and created an organization that had more than one million followers and members. In 1949 
Nokrashy Pashahe was assassinated and Hassan al-Hazibi succeeded him. Syed Qutb who lived in the US then was 
witness to the happiness of Americans upon hearing the news of his assassination and was greatly impressed. 
Following the revolution/coup of Free Egypt officers in 1952 under the leadership of Muhammad Najeeb and Jamal 
Abd al-Naseer (that resulted in the overthrow of Malik Faruq) the basis of disagreement between Brotherhood and 
Nasir was laid, insofar as after his assassination attempt in 1954, a large numbers of Brotherhood followers were 
arrested. The key disagreement of Brotherhood and Naseer lied in the Islamist demands of Muslim Brotherhood under 
the leadership of Syed Qutb and nationalist pan-Arabic policies of Naseer. Following the intensification of these 
discords a new wave of arrests started in 1965 that led to the execution of Syed Qutb in 1966; an execution that one 
can feasibly say was the last nail on the coffin of Naseerism. On the other hand, the tortures of Naseerian regime led  
to the radicalization of the members of the second generation of Brotherhood and finally Naseer’s defeat before Israel 
in 1967 broke the grandeur of his nationalistic and socialistic ideology in the Arab world and resulted in Islamization 
of Arab societies following his death in 1970 (Dekmejian, 2011: 149-157). Of course, Anwar Sadat’s policy of  
leaving Naseer’s legacy behind played a significant role in the emergence of an ideological gap in Egypt that was 
filled by violence and radicalism of the second generation of Brotherhood, the same generation that in 1981 
assassinated him in the age of triple Jihadi movements
6
.From the beginning of 1990s and after the death of Naseer, 
political Islam presented itself as a supreme signifier, the signifier that not only was not a regressive and defensive 
reaction, rather as a political and social alternative, it offered new aspirations and goals regarding the development  
and evolution of Middle East and its deliverance from the chaotic situation and retrieval of Islamic majesty under the 
banner of Salafism (Esposito and Voll, 2014: 23-24).All aforementioned individuals and currents can be called the 
first generation of Salafism who are the inspirational sources of the radicalized Takfirist and Salafist generations after 
1970s (to whom we will allude to in the coming section titled; Crises and Answers). These intellectual movements  
and individuals share four beliefs despite their differences: 1- commitment to revival of nation and purification of 
Muslim creed from superstitions and heresies through returning to Islamic roots (Salafism): Quran, Sunnah, past 
tradition, followers, followers’ followers, Messenger of Allah’s community;
7
 2- supporting conflict and Jihad in 






It refers to the organizations Al-Tahrir al-Islami, Al-Takfirva al-Hijra and Al-Jihad all of which emerged out of the 
crises of 1970s in Egypt. 
7 
Besides the denial of superficial reading of sacred scripture, one of the key differences of Shiism and 
aforementioned currents is the belief in non-authority of disciples and their quoted traditions (except those cases that 
are matched with Quran) (Tabatabaei, 1977: 46). 
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preparedness for confrontation with religious and political domination and the interest in self-sacrifice for Islam 
(Dekmejian, 2011: 82-83; cf. Movathaqi, 2014: 123-126).
8
 
2- Crises and Responses: Role of Social Crises in the Emergence of Contemporary Takfirist and Salafist 
Movements: 
Previous parts sought to explain the intellectual foundations of Salafist movements. Now this part is an effort to 
provide an analysis of role of contemporary social crises in the emergence of contemporary Takfirist and Salafist 
movements relying on the discussions raised in previous parts regarding the theoretical framework based on the 
“circular theory” of Harair Dekmejian. 
2-1- Triple Generations: From Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation) in Egypt to Al-Dawlat al-Islami (Islamic 
State) in Iraq 
Following the outbreak of WWI, which is considered by Bernard Lewis to be: “the climax of Islam’s retreat before the 
advancement of West” (Lewis, 2014: 354), balkanization of Middle East region, the ratification of Sykes-Picot 
Agreement by UK and France in 1916, recognition of Balfour Declaration by Britain on November 1917 (according to 
which Jews have the right to found a national territory for themselves), and finally the fall of Ottoman Empire as the 
last Islamic political system based on caliphate discourse in 1922 (which had survived for six centuries in the 
Mediterranean region and for four centuries in the Middle East) undermined the foundations of the old and relatively 
legitimate and accepted the order of the Islamic World.This disintegration led to the emergence of an epistemological 
sinkhole on the vicissitudinous scene of ideological conflicts in response to which three “secular”, “nationalist” and 
“Islamist” social movements emerged. Upon the failure of Secular movement to fulfill the goal of Kamalist policies, 
Gamal Abdel Naseer’s nationalism and ethnicism turned to the point on which Arab World relied. Soon the incorrect 
policies of Naseer concerning Muslim Brotherhood as well as his notorious defeat from Israel in the Six-Day War in 
1967 broke his dominance and once again despondence and despair prevailed in the spirit of Arabs. One may say that 
after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Nasserism’s failure in 1970 was the greatest social crisis in Middle East, a crisis 
that was exacerbated first by the invasion of USSR in Afghanistan (that turned the country to a stronghold of Muslim 
hardliners and Takfirists and Salafists) amid Cold War and thereafter with post 9/11 US attacks in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. After Naseer’s death in 1970 three movements took form: 
1- Islamic Liberation Organization (Al-Tahrir al-Islami) led by SalehSaryeh, 
2- Excommunication and Immigration (Jamat al-Muslimin) led by Shukri Mustafa, and 
3- Jihad Organization under the ideological leadership of Abd al-Salam Faraj – all of which were in some way 
inspired by Muslim Brotherhood in general and by Syed Qutb in particular (of course we should not ignore their 
fundamental differences). The first two movements were eradicated respectively in 1976 and 1978; but Jihad 
Organization (that assassinated Anwar Sadat through Khaled Islambouli in 1981) that remerged in late 1980s in 
“Egyptian Islamic Jihad” organization under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri (the current leader of al-Qaeda) 
continued to exist thanks to its special features and left more effective traces on its followers. Some of these features 
consisted of: 
1- powerful organization, 2- belief in permeation into all government elements and presence in society, 3- belief in 
consultative and collective leadership, 4- organizational structure, power separation, spiritual leadership (Sheikh Omar 
Abdel-Rahman) 5- democratic centralism (Dekmejian, 2011: 173-177). Ideological leadership of this organization 
based on the teachings of Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj (intellectual father of al-Qaeda) was founded in Al-Farida 
al-gha'iba (The Neglected Duty). These teachings added Jihad (armed confrontation) as the Sixth Article to the 
Quintuple Islamic Articles of Faith. Thus this article of faith not only was declared necessary for the establishment of 
Islamic State and revival of Caliphate but anyone who breached it should have been considered an infidel (Faraj, 
1981: 3-5). Some of these teachings are: true Muslims should declare Jihad on the leaders of the West and the East 
and this is obligatory for them though it has been forgotten, and the superficial Muslim leaders who do not act 
according to Islam are apostates. “Those who rule not based on Divine Revelation are surely apostates”. Death is the 
penalty of such rulers and cooperation with them is a sin. Continuous Jihad against the rule of infidels is the highest 
and noblest tasks of true Muslims. Armed Jihad is the only acceptable form of Jihad and so on and so forth 
(Dekmejian, 2011: 179-181; also cf. Faraj, 1981: 6-8). All the aforementioned organizations (despite their deep 
ideological differences) can be declared among the first generation of contemporary Takfirist Salafist movements after 
1970s. Most of these Salafist movements survived until the early 1980s; but Jihad Organization continued its activity 
even after the execution of Abd al-Salam Faraj. This movement experienced its turning point in USSR vs. 
Afghanistan war and finally in the formation of Al-Qaeda in 1988. The chief reason for the formation of Al-Qaeda 
and promotion of Ladenism should be sought for in the military intervention of USSR in Afghanistan and then (as it 
has been mentioned by Bin Laden himself) the presence of Americans in Saudi Arabia (that is a symbol of sacrilege to 
Muslim Holy Land) amid Gulf War as well as the use of Saudi Arabia as a means for invasion of Iraq (Lewis, 2015: 
146). Immigration and the escape of some members of the aforementioned organizations (Al-Tahrir al-Islami, Al- 
 
8 
It is needless to say that enumeration of all effective figures in Salafism discourse as well as detailed explanation of 
their ideas were not within the scope of the current essay. Thus we suffice to this amount of discussion. Moreover, we 
will discuss the contemporary Salafist figures, ideas, and movements, i.e. from 1970s onward (who have experience 
greater paradigmatic turns as compared to their predecessors) because they have close relationship with social and 
political crises and challenges. 
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Takfir, Al-Hijra and Al-Jihad) to Saudi Arabia led to a huge paradigmatic turn in the mind and soul of the totality of 
them. This turn paved the ground for the interpretation of political semi-Jihadism of Qutbism against the colonial 
domination in the context of Takfirist ideology of Salafist Wahhabism that had been forgotten under the shadow of 
“unity of graves” and “unity of defects”. It was this great transformation that led to the foundation of Peshawar Al- 
Qaeda and the emergence of neo-Salafist Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Anyway, such Jihadist movements as Al-Qaeda under the 
intellectual leadership of Abdullah ‘Ezam and the practical leadership of Bin Laden and after him Ayman al-Zawahiri 
can be considered the second generation of Takfirist Salafist movements. This new generation despite its actions like 
9/11 still retained its proximity with other Muslim sects and had fighting with US and Israel as its priority; but the 
major development occurred after the emergence of a man called Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. After US invasion of 
Afghanistan and after itthat of Iraq,Zarqawi’s group JimahBayat al-Imam fi al-Ordun (1966)changed its name first to 
Jamah al-Tawhidva al-Jihad (2001) and then to TanzimQaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn(2004) and in the same 
year it announced its allegiance to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. Zarqawi in 2006 voiced his decision of the formation of 
Islamic State in Iraq to revive the caliphate; this is the same state that was led after his death by Abu Omar al- 
Baghdadi and after him by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir one of his high ranked deputies until 2010 and after their death in 
2013 this movement has undergone a boring suspension. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2012 that 
was considered an insignificant political action, Islamic State found an appropriate atmosphere for reemergence and 
the implementation of new plans drawn by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi six years earlier. The rise of Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2013 was owing to previous crises and 
developments(Bunzel, 2015: 5).The ideology of ISIS should be understood in two stages: knowing this group’s 
Salafist Jihadism that is the focal point of its political thought and its violent and radical action against infidels and 
particularly Shias and these distinguish it from Al-Qaeda and this is the main reason of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s refusal  
of its endorsement. The intellectual forefather of contemporary Islamic State is Zarqawi, the man from whom ISIS has 
drawn its radical and violent model of Jihadi Salafism. Zarqawi was first trained by his mentor Abu Muhammad al- 
Muqaddasi (who does also have radical stances on Shia), but later even Al-Muqaddasi condemned him due to his 
radical anti-Shia approach. Anti-Shiism and the revival of caliphate, based on the teachings of IbnTaymiyyah and 
Muhammad Ibn Abdel Wahhab, are two basic pillars of his radical theories and ideas; in other words, the same ideas 
whose manifestation can be seen in the current actions of ISIS. Speeches and texts of Islamic State insist on some 
ideological notions among most important ones of which one can refer to the following: 1- all Muslims are obliged to 
join true Muslims (who have gathered under the banner of Islamic State) and help them and fight the infidels; 2- 
negligence in implementation of Sharia of Allah is tantamount to apostasy; 3- fighting Islamic State is an act of 
infidelity; 4- Shia Muslims are infidels who deserve to die; 5- Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas are traitors and 
enemies of Islam (Ibid: 9-10).Zarqawi and after him Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were hugely influenced by two 
contemporary radical Salafist jurists, i.e. 1- Abu BakrNaji the author of Edarat al-Tawahush, 2- Abu Abdullah al- 
Muhajir al-Misri the author of Masael min Fiqh al-Jihad (Fiqh al-Dima’). The first book is a strategic manifesto  
while the other is the jurisprudential manifesto of ISIS. These two works promote radicalism and political violence 
using an anarchistic and nihilistic approach that can be only compared with Catechism of a RevolutionarybySergey 
Nechayevand 19
th
 century Russian anarchism. Parts of the major themes of Edarat al-Tawahushare as follows: 
flexibility and stagnation are two elements involved in the failure of every Jihadi action, those who act moderately are 
recommended to stay home, occurrence of any weakness and laziness will result in disintegration and power 
exhaustion, for convincing the youth to join us for war we need to spur hatred in them and get people involved in the 
war. We have to manage this war in a very radical and violent fashion; in a way that fear increases the heart-beats 
(Naji, 2004: 31-33). This work can be considered a modern version of IbnTaymiyyah’sAl-Syasat al-Shar’iathat 
provides the political strategies needed for the management of society. The main themes of Fiqh al-Jihad (that is of 
jurisprudential and religious bent) that deals with twenty problems can be outlined as follows: 1- Dar al-Islam va Dar 
al-Kufr: Abu Abdullah al-Misrioffers the dichotomy of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufrbased on Quranic verses and 
prophetic traditions and describes every land in which Islamic law is not observed as Dar al-Kufr (Land of Infidelity) 
(Al-Muhajir, nd., 18). 2- Rulers who do not observe the Divine Codes are infidels. 3- Islam is not just a verbal citation 
of Islamic Articles of Faith including daily prayer, paying alms and fasting and mere infidelity is an evidence  for 
death penalty. 4- Support of infidels (including Christians, Jews and Shia) is tantamount to apostasy. 5- Shia Muslims 
and Khawarij are deviated and infidels: he believes that it is not allowed to use Shias in the battle against infidels  
rather they are all deceptive and diabolic and should be excommunicated (ibid: 358-360). In other chapters of his own 
book he turns to the legitimacy of terror, suicide bombing, kidnapping, burning and drowning the infidels, making no 
discrimination regarding military and civilians in war, legitimacy of killing of captives and the like. What should be 
noted in this context is the unavoidable synthesis of social crises in mass societies and theological and jurisprudential 
teachings of Salafist and Wahhabi radical jurists through a circular and dialectical process; in every stage of the 
dialectical process the concrete form of multidimensional and miscellaneous social crises influences the totality of 
process in the form of the dominated social structures (mutually connected coherent union of social crises and 
movements). To put it otherwise, the overall framework of the process of theoretical and practical evolution of 
Takfirist and Salafist movements is a part of its particular content that can be just analyzed in its sociological 
formulation (political sociology). The aforementioned groups and movements from Zarqawi to Baghdadi can be 
declared the third generation of TakfiristSalafist streams (or neo-Salafism), the generation whose logic is justification 
as means for the achievement of the goal and does not care about resorting to any form of violent crime. 
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Salafist Social Movements: Product of Social Crises or Islamic Teachings? 
Previous sections sought to explain the intellectual and social foundations of TakfiristSalafist movements in a 
concise manner as well as their interrelation. The significant question that can be raised here is: What is the essential 
relationship between Islamic teachings and contemporary radical takfiristSalafist movements in the Middle East? Are 
these radical doctrines (that are incessantly produced by Salafist radical jurists) rooted in the very nature of Islam or 
are they mere products of special interpretations (like those presented by TakfiristSalafist groups) in the context of 
social crises? The truth is that the notion of pure unconditional Islamic Textualismdoes not have any place in 
sociological debates, rather we have to consider the society a “concrete totality” in which everything is synthetic and 
dialectic. Religious texts and Quranic verses that refer to Jihad, regardless of numerous commentaries that have been 
offered of them, have continuously existed in the course of history. Why have the same doctrines been the source of 
peace and peaceful coexistence in certain eras of human history without being the fountainhead of radicalism (as 
manifested in the contemporary Salafist movements)? The core intention of the current essay is contextualization of 
doctrines within a sociological framework and in view of social, political and geopolitical backgrounds avoiding 
essentialistic and orientalistic approach to religion. Since religions, particularly Islam before Christianity, have been 
the victims of this view it is so surprising that today essentialistic notion of Islam in a nominalist form is so prevalent. 
It is this very view that reduces Islam as a unique signifier to various Islamic sects from Islamic radicalism, Islamic 
terrorism, Islamic fascism, Islamic totalitarianism and Islamic fundamentalism. Regardless of social relevance of these 
doctrines, pondering on them despite its rewards has continuously been an epistemological danger in the path of 
common sense and the arguments that interpret the notions in vacuum away from their social contexts. In his paper on 
Islam and Political Violence, John Esposito has dealt with this issue and alluded to the misuses 
ofTakfiristSalafistmovementsof Quran for legitimization of their actions. In this regard, he writes: “While a great 
number of believers are reading Islamic texts in their historical contexts, religious fundamentalists and terrorists 
misuse these texts as an excuse for their actions”(Esposito, 2015: 1068). Philip Jenkins who has conducted an 
independent study of the number of violent verses in the Quran and the Gospels after 9/11 and published the research 
results in Jesus Wars: How Four Patriarchs, Three Queens, and Two Emperors Decided What Christians Would 
Believe for the Next 1,500 yearsannounced that he has surprisingly found that violent verses are comparatively fewer 
in Quran than in the Gospels. He compares the social situation in twentieth century Islamic Middle East with  
Christianity in fifth century and concludes that all horrible political violence that is perpetuated today under  the 
banner of Islam and through such Takfirist andSalafist movements as Al-Qaeda have had records in Christian world 
and basically understanding Islamic Middle East can contribute to understanding Christian history and vice versa. 
(Jenkins, 2010: 56-58). Accordingly, one can conclude that besidesstudying the teachings,we need to explain the 
“social situation” in which they have emerged in order to analyze the quality of emergence of Salafist social 
movements. In other words, besides intellectual foundations and textual bases, reflection on the role of social crises in 
the emergence of contemporary Takfirist and Salafist movements that was referred to before this under a 
multidimensional comprehensive approach is necessary. 
Conclusion. As we mentioned in the introduction and the research questions, the aim of the current research 
is explanation and analysis of intellectual and social foundations of the emergence of contemporary Salafist 
movements in a synthetic manner. This explanation and analysis sought to dialectically and circularly reveal the role 
of historical and social crises in the emergence of ideas that have been propounded in the works of such Salafist 
thinkers as IbnTaymiyyah, Abu BakrNaji, Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir al-Misrias well as their multidimensional and 
miscellaneous nature in the context of TakfiristSalafist movements that promote violence and terror in the Middle 
East. In the course of this research through an intellectual genealogy of Salafist movements the role of Muslim 
Brotherhood as the root of political Islam in contemporary era was shown through an exposition of the social contexts, 
crises and responses in the confrontation between the West and the Islamic world and it was argued that contemporary 
Salafist movements are the result of promotion of crises and thoughts. These social crises and contexts can be traced 
back to the fall of Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, Mongol invasion, WWI, Sykes-Picot Agreement, Balfour 
Declaration, fall of Ottoman Empire, and the birth of Muslim Brotherhood, death of Gamal Abdel Naseer, and war in 
Algeria, USSR, Afghanistan and Iraq. In the current historical era, the world is witness to a bloody horror that has 
emerged in the form of such movements as ISIS, Jibhat al-Nusra, Boko Haram, Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and aims at 
domination over the infidel world and changing it to Dar al-Islam. Thus everyday a new wave of violence and conflict 
surges in Middle East and other corners of the world. An unprecedented invasion and terror with an anarchistic 
approach that is associated with brutality and barbarism this time in contrast to previous generations reveals its  
horrific face without any reservation and hurts people’s emotions with utmost cruelty; but, what is the reason for this 
amount of violence and barbarism? Is thislicentious wave of violence “one-sided” and blindly upsurges in the Western 
and Islamic countries? What is the reason of the happiness and joy derived by many TakfiristSalafistsfrom bombings 
and suicide operations in western countries that are an expression of repressed complexes? These are the questions  
that should be pondered upon and discussed more. Almost 50 years ago Jean Paul Sartre wrote anintroduction to  
Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earthunder the title of “A Tribunal for West” after witnessing Algerian war in 
which more than one million Algerians were massacred; there he offered an interesting analysis of the behavior of 
western world and France with Algeria that perhaps has been less considered as regards the latest events. In this 
introduction Sartre speaks of “hatred confrontation” or a “reversed violence” that will surge through this “fat and pale 
continent”. He also notes that: the memory of brutal policies of western colonialists towards Algerian Muslims and 
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other Islamic countries can be never eliminated from the minds unless via retaliatory invasion and conflict (Fanon, 
1988: 22-25). Which invasion does Sartre mention that needs to be retaliated if we want to neutralize it? What relation 
and similarity do brutal Salafist movements have with western hidden invasions and violations? Baudrillardconsiders 
fundamental violence of terrorism an expression of the denial of all institutions representing the western states that 
aim the silenced masses (Baudrillard, 2008: 79-81).Žižekregards it a luring temptation that overshadows the subjects 
(particularly western people) and makes them prioritize their instinctual reactions over the logical and abstract 
arguments and thus lose their thinking power and take “bare violence” as the main cause and forget “hidden violence” 
(Žižek, 2015: 12;cf.Michaud,2002: 57-59). Accordingly, it seems that analysis of the quality of the relationship 
between western world and Islamic world in the course of history and particularly in the last century or half century 
can reveal the reason of the emergence of radical terrorist actions in the form of TakfiristSalafistradical movements;  
of course, we cannot understand the bare and reversed violence that we are witnessed to now merely based on the 
concept of hidden violence and western policies in relation to Islamic world or pro-violence religious texts and 
jurisprudential ideas of Salafist thinkers and jurists as well as the social and political crises in individual form, rather 
the best comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon is more dependent on a multivariate synthetic analysis that 
includes all these elements; this study sought to near itself to such an analysis that undoubtedly needs further future 
researches in order to be complete. 
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